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CRIMINAL LAW
John S. Baker, Jr.*
UNAUTHORIZED USE OF MOVABLES
The unauthorized use of movables statute' addresses mainly the
problem of automobile joyriding but applies to the unauthorized use
of any movable.2 State v. Bias3 involves the attempted application of
the statute to the breach of a rental agreement on a television.
Bias had "rented"4 a television, but he breached the rental agree-
ment by discontinuing weekly payments after the sixth payment and
also by moving the television to his new place of residence without
receiving permission from the owner.' When contacted, Bias agreed
to resume payment, although he never did so. The trial court con-
victed Bias on the theory that discontinuing payment without notify-
ing the television owner of its new location constituted unauthorized
use.' The supreme court reversed, holding that Louisiana Revised
Statutes 14:68 "must reasonably be construed to require the existence
of fraudulent intent."7 The court's holding was based on its conclu-
sion that "otherwise, every breach of a rental contract would be in-
cluded within the reach of the statute.'
The court's rationale included several points. First, the court did
not believe the legislature intended every breach of a rental agree-
Copyright 1982, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
* Associate Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. CRIMINAL CODE: LA. R.S. 14:68 (1950 & Supp. 1980 & 1981) provides in pertinent
part:
Unauthorized use of a movable is the intentional taking or use of a movable which
belongs to another, either without the other's consent, or by means of fraudulent
conduct, practices, or representations, but without any intention to deprive the
other of the movable permanently. The fact that the movable so taken or used
may be classified as an immovable, according to the law pertaining to civil mat-
ters, is immaterial.
2. See LA. R.S. 14:68, comments.
3. 400 So. 2d 650 (La. 1981).
4. The defendant argued that the agreement with the furniture dealer who had
supplied the television should have been construed as a sale rather than a lease, thus
making the defendant the owner. The court avoided deciding this question and reversed
for insufficient evidence. Id. at 651 n.1.
5. Id. at 651.
6. Id. at 652 n.3.
7. Id. at 652.
8. Id.
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ment to constitute a violation of Criminal Code article 68. Second,
even if the legislature so intended, the court considered the statute
ambiguous and construed it in favor of the defendant. Finally, the
court referred to the principle that every crime must have a mens rea.
The court's rationale rests on recognized principles of construc-
tion. Its conclusion reflects a very legitimate concern for the implica-
tions of affirming the conviction. Nevertheless, its guidance for future
cases of this sort is questionable in that it notes "the state may pro-
duce direct or circumstantial evidence of 'fraudulent intent' in
unauthorized use cases involving the initial acquisition of property
by rental agreement."9 This statement implies that if the original "tak-
ing" in a rental agreement is apparently lawful, it is not permissible
to prove the "use" thereafter became unlawful through fraud or lack
of consent. The statute's inclusion of the word "use," as an alter-
native to "taking," covers at least two types of situations which would
not otherwise be covered because of common law limitations on
"taking.""0 First, where a taking is unlawful because it is without con-
sent or through fraud, the defendant may not have been responsible
or may not be proven to have been responsible for the taking, even
though he "uses" the property knowing full well that the "use" is
unlawful. Suppose, for instance, a case where a bicycle taken from
X is found in the possession of Y, who claims to have received it from
a friend, Z, for temporary use." The evidence may prove that, at some
point after receiving the bicycle, the defendant realized his use was
without the consent of the owner, but he nevertheless continued to
use it, although without an intent to permanently deprive. Such a
case should constitute unauthorized use. Second, the "use" of a thing
which is originally lawful because the "taking" was with consent and
without fraud may become unlawful sometime during the use of the
9. Id. at 653 (emphasis added).
10. The common law definition of "larceny" limited the crime to a "trespassory,
taking" from the possession of the owner. This limitation excluded from "larceny,"
and left to legislation, what have become known as the crimes of embezzlement and
false pretenses. The theft statute, LA. R.S. 14:67 (Supp. 1968, 1970 & 1972), which con-
solidated these three separate crimes by eliminating the common law distinctions, uses
the word "misappropriation" as an alternative to "taking." See LA. R.S. 14:67, com-
ments. The unauthorized use statute is a lesser included offense of theft which basically
incorporates this alternative form, except that "use" is employed instead of "misap-
propriation." In re Batiste, 367 So. 2d 784, 789 (La. 1979), impliedly equates "use" and
"misappropriation." The difference in terminology between the two statutes seems
due to the more limited object of the unlawful act in the unauthorized use statute,
a "movable," rather than "anything of value," which is the object of the unlawful act
in the theft statute. See State v. Gisclair, 382 So. 2d 914 (La. 1980).
11. These facts are similar to those of In re Batiste, 367 So. 2d 784 (La. 1979),
except that the evidence in Batiste indicated that the defendant had obtained the bicycle
lawfully. Id. at 789.
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thing. Suppose the owner, X, lends property to Y for a definitely
stated, limited period of time. The evidence may prove that the defen-
dant 'took lawfully, with an intent to return the property at the stated
time, but later he decided to keep the property for an extended period
of time-again without the intent to deprive permanently. This also
should constitute the crime of unauthorized use of movables.
Proof of a violation of article 68 consists of two basic elements,
each involving an alternative formulation: (1) intentional taking or use,
and (2) either without the other's consent or by means of fraudulent
conduct. Analytically then, there are four possible ways to violate the
statute: (1) an intentional taking without consent, (2) an intentional
taking by means of fraudulent conduct, (3) an intentional use without
consent, and (4) an intentional use by means of fraudulent conduct.
In Bias, situation (1) does not apply because the taking was with
consent. Situation (2) also is inapplicable given the court's reversal
because of lack of evidence establishing the taking was accomplished
through fraud.12 The court rules out the possibility that situations (3)
and (4) can be established by failure to make rental payments.13 Situa-
tion (3) would have been inapplicable in any event because the defen-
dant's continued "use" of the television was apparently consented to
a second time by the company when the defendant agreed to resume
payments." This suggests the possibility that when the owner con-
sented a second time the consent was "induced" by a fraudulent
representation of the defendant's intent to pay. Although the court
concluded that the evidence was insufficient to establish fraud at the
initial taking, it seems not to have considered the possibility of
evidence of fraud at a later point.
Should Bias be limited to its facts or should the proof of
unauthorized use in any rental agreement necessarily involve proof
of fraud at "the initial acquisition of the property by rental
agreement"?1 Certainly, the court must be concerned about routine-
ly treating the breach of rental, agreements as crime."6 The criminal
courts ought not to be congested with matters that are essentially
civil. On the other hand, the word "use" in article 68 is intended to
have some meaning. It is not difficult to imagine a fraudulent scheme
in which the original taking under a rental agreement involves a con-
sent from the owner obtained by fraud which can not be proven as
12. State v. Bias, 400 So. 2d at 653.
13. Id. at 652.
14. See id. at 651.
15. Id. at 653.
16. This transaction, while in the form of a lease, was arguably a sale. See note
4, si pra.
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such. Whether the lessee who fails to continue payments or to return
the property, where there is no proof of an intent to deprive per-
manently, should be immune in all circumstances involves the prob-
lem of proving fraud.
The historical development of the law related to theft has exclud-
ed certain types of fraud based on promises. 7 In eliminating the com-
mon law distinctions associated with larceny, the Criminal Code pur-
ports to punish in theft, and therefore in the lesser included offense
of unauthorized use, what had previously been characterized as only
civil fraud.9 Nevertheless, as pointed out in last year's symposium
article on criminal law, the Criminal Code does not define fraud.'9 In
the absence of a definition, it is not surprising to see the court han-
dle cases involving fraud on an ad hoc basis. It appears, however,
that without utilizing common law distinctions, the court is prepared
to inhibit the prosecution of certain commercial types of fraud. While
the common law made such distinctions to protect the seller,0 the
court is clearly siding with the consumer-at least in rental
arrangements.
ATTEMPTED RAPE-THE MENTAL ELEMENT
State v. Parish,2' on rehearing, set aside a conviction of attemp-
ted aggravated rape and substituted the lesser conviction of attemp-
ted forcible rape.22 In reaching what may have been the correct result
in this case, the plurality opinion23 created confusion regarding the
mental element required in attempted aggravated rape.
The facts of the case persuaded four of the justices-a slightly
different majority from that which produced the judgment-that the
defendant was not guilty of so serious a crime as attempted
17. See J. HALL, THEFT, LAW AND SOCIETY 45-46 (2d ed. 1952) and R. PERKINS,
CRIMINAL LAW, 303-06 (2d ed. 1969), for a discussion of fraud in false pretenses.
18. See LA. R.S. 14:67, comments.
19. Hargrave, Developments in the Law, 1980-1981-Criminal Law, 42 LA. L. REV.
541, 547-48 (1982).
20. See J. HALL supra note 17, at 70 & 76.
21. 405 So. 2d 1080 (La. 1981) (on rehearing).
22. State v. Byrd, 385 So. 2d 248 (La. 1980), allows the substitution of a lesser
included conviction when it is necessarily found by the jury in the case.
23. Six justices thought the defendant was guilty of at least attempted forcible
rape. Justice Dennis, in an opinion also reflecting the views of Chief Justice Dixon
and Justice Calogero, determined that the evidence supported only an attempted for-
cible rape conviction. Justice Lemmon, who thought the conviction of attempted ag-
gravated rape should be affirmed, nevertheless concurred in the result in order to
achieve a majority for the judgment. Justices Blanche and Marcus, dissenting, would
have affirmed the attempted aggravated rape conviction. Justice Watson, dissenting,
would have reversed and discharged the defendant.
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aggravated rape. The defendant initially acted as one about to com-
mit an aggravated rape, including making a threat to kill the victim. '
Then, however, he apologized and voluntarily left the apartment. This
voluntary abandonment decisively influenced the court's view of the
case.2" Although it did not cure the attempt," the abandonment did
seem to diminish the attempt's seriousness in the view of some of
the justices more so than if the completed crime had been prevented
because the defendant was seized or frightened away. While six
justices thought the defendant was guilty of an attempted rape, a
plurality of three justices determined that the evidence proved that
the defendant was guilty only of the lesser form, attempted forcible
rape.
Influenced by the fact of abandonment, the plurality opinion seems
to distinguish between attempted aggravated rape and attempted for-
cible rape on the basis of a lack of sexual contact.' Such a distinc-
tion, however, goes to the difference between rape and either assault
or battery, as reflected in the dissent of Justice Watson. 8 If the lack
of sexual contact is deemed decisive, then it should negate any form
of rape, for it suggests the defendant's acts were not "proximate"
enough to the harm of rape.' The plurality opinion seems to confuse
the type of harm (rape versus assault or battery with the degree
of harm (aggravated versus forcible).
If, however, the defendant's acts were sufficient to establish some
form of attempted rape, what distinguishes the harm of attempted
aggravated rape from that of attempted forcible rape? First of all,
"[tihe only distinction between aggravated and forcible rape is the
degree of force employed and the extent to which the victim resists."'
24. "The victim testified that the defendant obtained entry to her apartment under
false pretenses, seized her by the throat, clasped her mouth, said he wanted to make
love, warned that he would kill her if she screamed, and dragged her toward a bedroom."
405 So. 2d at 1087. See also id. 1082, for the more complete statement of facts found
in the original opinion.
25. The plurality notes that abandonment in the situation where there is no out-
side cause is a defense in some states. Id. at 1086 n.3. The concurring opinion notes
that the "case is difficult because defendant withdrew before completing the rape,
perhaps indicating he never intended to carry out the threats that he had made."
Id. at 1089.
26. See id. at 1089 n.2 (Lemmon, J., concurring). But see id. at 1086 n.3 (Dennis,
J., plurality).
27. "He did not fondle the victim or subject her to any sexual indignity." Id. at
1087; see also id. at 1083 (Dennis, J., dissenting in the original decision).
28. Id. at 1090 (Watson, J., dissenting).
29. See HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAw 583-86 (2d ed. 1960), for a
discussion of the common law theory of attempt in terms of the distinction between
"proximate" and "remote."
30. State v. Turnbull, 377 So. 2d 72, 76 (La. 1979).
19821
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The force and resistance evidence lack of consent." In fact, the victim
either does or does not consent. If sufficient force and resistance are
proven to establish lack of consent, the only factual distinction be-
tween aggravated and forcible rape involves the degree of force
used. Likewise, in an attempt, the degree of force must distinguish at-
tempted forcible rape from attempted aggravated rape. Must, however,
the defendant also have specifically intended to use the greater degree
of force?
The plurality applies the specific intent requirement of the at-
tempt statute, not only to the elements of rape as defined in article
41, but also to those circumstances which distinguish aggravated rape
from forcible rape. This construction, the writer submits, involves a
misreading of the applicable articles of the Criminal Code. Article 41,
which is not mentioned by the plurality, defines the word "rape."
Articles 42, 42.1, and 43 specify the different kinds of rape and pro-
vide different punishments. These latter articles differ not in terms
of the essential elements of rape, which are defined in article 41, but
in terms of the circumstances in which it can be said the victim did
not consent.3 In any attempted rape, as in all attempts, the defen-
dant must have "a specific attempt to commit a crime." 4 Article 10
states that specific intent exists when "the offender actively desired
the prescribed cri'minal consequences to follow his act or failure to
act."35 In an attempted rape, therefore, the defendant must have
specifically intended the criminal consequence, as defined in article
41: "sexual intercourse with a male or female person who is not the
spouse of the offender, committed without the person's lawful
consent."36 That is, the defendant must have specifically intended to
do the act without the victim's consent. There seems to be no reason,
however, why it must also be proven that he specifically intended
those circumstances which evidence the lack of consent.
The plurality's statements about specific intent were unnecessary
31. Compare LA. R.S. 14:41 (Supp. 1978) with LA. R.S. 14:42 (Supp. 1978 & 1981) &
14:42.1 (Supp. 1978).
32. LA. R.S. 14:41 provides in pertinent part: "Rape is the act of anal or vaginal sex-
ual intercourse with a male or female' person who is not the spouse of the offender,
committed without the person's lawful consent. Emission is not necessary; ind any
sexual penetration, vaginal or anal, however slight is sufficient to complete the crime."
33. Simple rape can be a responsive verdict to the charges of aggravated and
forcible rape. State v. Turnbull, 377 So. 2d 72 (La. 1979); State v. Miller, 237 La. 266,
111 So. 2d 108 (1959). Currently, however, simple rape is not a listed responsive ver-
dict to either aggravated or forcible rape. See LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 814, as amended
by 1982 La. Acts, No. 763, S 1.
34. LA. R.S. 14:27 (Supp. 1970 & 1975).
35. LA. R.S. 14:10 (1950) (emphasis added).
36. LA. R.S. 14:41 (Supp. 1978).
[Vol. 43
DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LAW, 1981-1982
to the decision. The plurality may have been justified in concluding
that the evidence did not prove sufficient acts of force to establish
the circumstances necessary for attempted aggravated rape. The court
could have reached this conclusion without construing the crime of
attempted aggravated rape to require proof that the defendant
specifically intended not only the consequences, but also the atten-
dant circumstances.
37
SECOND-DEGREE BATTERY-THE MENTAL ELEMENT
The court in State v. Fuller affirmed a conviction of second-degree
battery against an off-duty "bouncer" whose blow to the head per-
manently blurred the vision of his victim. In holding that the evidence
supported the conviction, the court stated that the second-degree bat-
tery statute requires proof of specific intent.3 9
The second-degree battery statute, 0 enacted in 1978, fills a gap
in the law which occurs when the defendant inflicts serious injury
without using a dangerous weapon. Simple battery, which includes
any nonconsensual, unlawful touching without a dangerous weapon,
no longer carries a sufficient maximum possible punishment to do
justice in cases of serious injury." While aggravated battery does carry
a more serious penalty, it does not apply to a battery resulting in
serious injury inflicted without a dangerous weapon.2 Second-degree
battery, with a greater penalty and no requirement of a dangerous
weapon, does apply to batteries resulting in serious injury.
37. It might clarify matters if in the intent articles the Criminal Code distinguished
between circumstances and consequences. The Model Penal Code initiated, and the pro-
posed Federal Criminal Code has carried forward, distinctions in the state of mind re-
quirements as to "conduct," "circumstances," and "result." MODEL PENAL CODE S 1.13(9)
(Official Draft 1962). See H.R. 1647, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. S 301 (1981) (as introduced);
S. 1630, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. S 30 (1981) (as introduced). While such distinctions are
analytically useful, they may unnecessarily confuse a jury if incorporated into jury
instructions. See NATIONAL COMMISSION ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS, FINAL
REPORT S 302, comments (1971).
38. 414 So. 2d 306 (La. 1982).
39. Id. at 310.
40. LA. R.S. 14:34.1 (Supp. 1978) provides in pertinent part: "Second degree battery
is a battery committed without the consent of the victim when the offender inten-
tionally inflicts serious bodily injury."
41. LA. R.S. 14:35 (1950 & Supp. 1968), simple battery, was amended in 1968 to reduce
the maximum possible imprisonment from two years to six months. 1968 La. Acts,
No. 647, S 1. This and many other misdemeanors were amended to avoid the jury
trial requirement made applicable to the states for offenses carrying a possible term
of imprisonment exceeding six months. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968); see
also Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66 (1970).
42. LA. R.S. 14:34 (1950 & Supp. 1980) provides in pertinent part: "Aggravated bat-
tery is a battery committed with a dangerous weapon."
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Unlike aggravated battery, second degree-battery does require
actual proof of serious injury.48 Yet, does the statute reflect an inten-
tion to require proof that the serious injury was specifically intend-
ed? Like the simple and aggravated battery statutes, second-degree
battery incorporates the definition of battery found in article 33.' That
article itself includes a general intent. Second-degree battery adds
a second intent, namely, "when the offender intentionally inflicts
serious bodily injury." Citing principles of genuine construction, the
court concludes that by adding a second intent the legislature meant
to require a specific intent."
Standing alone, the clause "when the offender intentionally inflicts
serious bodily injury" involves only a general intent. As provided in
article 11, the terms "intent" and "intentional" have reference to
general intent "in the absence of qualifying provisions. ' Because the
second-degree battery statute added the word "intentionally" as an
element in addition to the general intent already required in the defini-
tion of battery, the court concludes the statute requires a specific
intent, but it does not explain why the crime could not provide for
two general intents.
This case demonstrates the confusion created by the division of
intent into general and specific."7 Although traditional, this distinc-
tion is somewhat artificial because the character of any intentional
conduct is that it is focused on something specific." The definition
of "specific intent" clearly conforms to commonly understood notions
of intentionality because the defendant's intention must focus not only
on the act but also on the "prescribed criminal consequences."4 For
example, in theft the defendant must not only intentionally take, but
also intend to deprive permanently.' The definition of "general in-
tent" conforms less well because, while referring to "prescribed
criminal consequences," it indicates the defendant's mind need not have
actively desired them, but only have "adverted" to them "as
43. 414 So. 2d at 309 (citing Legislative Symposium-Criminal Law, 39 LA. L. REV.
101, 229 (1978)).
44. LA. R.S. 14:33 (1950) provides: "Battery is the intentional use of force or violence
upon the person of another; or the intentional administration of a poison or other
noxious liquid or substance to another."
45. 414 So. 2d at 310.
46. LA. R.S. 14:11 (1950).
47. See J. HALL, supra note 29, at 142-44.
48. Id. at 142.
49. "Specific criminal intent is that state of mind which exists when the cir-
cumstances indicate that the offender actively desired the prescribed criminal conse-
quences to follow his act or failure to act." LA. R.S. 14:10(1) (1950).
50. LA. R.S. 14:67 (Supp. 1968, 1970 & 1972).
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reasonably certain to result from his act or failure to act.""1 As ap-
plied in at least some general intent crimes, such as battery, the in-
tention relates primarily to the act because the act and the criminal
consequences are almost inseparable. That is, the intentional act of
striking a person thereby produces the criminal consequence of
battery-unless, of course, the striking was done in self defense or
with consent.
Can a statute such as second-degree battery incorporate two in-
tent requirements? Or, does the statute's dual use of "intentional(ly)"
in effect equal a single specific intent? Second-degree battery requires
the defendant to have intended and completed a particular type of
battery, one involving serious bodily injury. Unlike the specific intent
crimes such as theft and burglary, however, this more particularized
consequence does not relate to a second intentional act but to the
one act of striking. The act of battering or striking, if sufficiently
strong, will produce not only a battery but also the more particularized
consequence, serious bodily injury. Apparently, the two intents relate
to the one act. In a specific intent crime such as theft or burglary,
by contrast, one's intentional act (taking or entering) may in fact com-
•plete the crime-insofar as the act requirement is concerned. The proof
also must establish a specific intent, namely, "the intent to commit
a felony or any theft therein."52 This second intent, however, actually
relates to a second act which in fact need not occur. The specific in-
tent element of each statute refers to further consequences (depriv-
ing the owner permanently or committing a felony or any theft therein)
which must be intended, but not necessarily completed. For these fur-
ther consequences in fact to occur, as they do in many cases, would
require a second act or ommission (failure to return the property or
the commission of a felony or theft).
This analysis should suggest the insufficiency for some purposes
of characterizing statutes simply as general intent or specific intent
crimes. In fact, each statute has its own particular mental element
defined by the relationship of intent, act, and consequences.' For ex-
ample, consider the following rewording of the second-degree battery
statute: "Second-degree battery is the intentional infliction of serious
bodily injury on the person of another committed without the con-
sent of the victim." Such a formulation, combining the definition of
battery and the requirement of serious bodily injury, utilizes the word
51. "General criminal intent is present whenever there is specific intent, and also
when the circumstances indicate that the offender, in the ordinary course of human
experience, must have adverted to the prescribed criminal consequences as reasonably
certain to result from his act or failure to act." LA. R.S. 14:10(2) (1950).
52. LA. R.S. 14:62 (Supp. 1972, 1978 & 1980).
53. J. HALL, supra note 29, at 142.
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"intentional" only once and without qualifying provisions, clearly
creating a general intent crime. Except for the label "general intent,"
rather than "specific intent," this alternative version differs from the
actual statute in form, but not in effect.
The actual statute, although mentioning two intentional acts,
qualifies the specific consequences produced by a single act of bat-
tery. It appears the legislative draftsmen may have chosen this form
in order to qualify the consequences produced by the act of battery
without qualifying the intent as a specific intent. The principal reason
for doing so would have been to avoid intoxication as a defense because
intoxication can negate specific, but not general, intent. 4 Otherwise,
there is essentially no practical difference between making second-
degree battery a general or a specific intent crime. The common sense
of a jury is likely to lead it to the same verdict, whether it is told
the crime requires two general intents or a specific intent. Such a
common sense approach more nearly coincides with the view, already
noted, that the distinction between general and specific intent is
somewhat artificial. Nevertheless, given the ambiguous wording of the
statute, it is understandable that the court labelled the intent a
qualified intent and therefore a specific intent.
Although not at issue in this case, the court's analysis of the
second-degree battery statute suggests a problem involving the respon-
siveness of a verdict of second-degree battery to a charge of ag-
gravated battery, as provided for in article 814 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure. Second-degree battery requires proof of an element (serious
bodily injury) not required by aggravated battery. As construed in
Fuller, second-degree battery requires proof of specific intent, while
aggravated battery requires only general intent. Thus, second-degree
battery requires proof of two elements not required in the proof of
aggravated battery. Under the decisions of the state supreme court,
even though legislatively designated as a responsive verdict, a lesser
verdict cannot be upheld constitutionally as a lesser verdict if it in-
volves proof not required by the greater crime."
54. LA. R.S. 14:15 (1950) provides in pertinent part:
The fact of an intoxicated or drugged condition of the offender at the time
of the commission of the crime is immaterial, except as follows:
(2) Where the circumstances indicate that an intoxicated or drugged condi-
tion has precluded the presence of a specific criminal intent or of special knowledge
required in a particular crime, this fact constitutes a defense to a prosecution
for that crime.
55. See State v. Booker, 385 So. 2d 1186, 1191-1192 (La. 1980) (on rehearing); State
v. Peterson, 290 So. 2d 307 (La. 1974).
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HOMICIDE -PRINCIPALS AND CAUSATION
In State v. Batiste,' the supreme court affirmed the manslaughter
conviction of a defendant who had inflicted one of two mortal wounds
on the victim. The evidence established that despite Batiste's fatal
wounding of the victim, another person, Bolden, wounded the victim
in a way that was "immediately fatal."57 Batiste contended, therefore,
that only Bolden could be convicted of a completed homicide. Reject-
ing this argument, the supreme court stated both that Batiste was
guilty as a principal and that "[s]eparate fatal wounds inflicted in one
encounter by two individuals make each guilty of the homicide."58
Justice Dennis's concurrence is worth noting because he thought
it was unnecessary "to broach the complex subject of causation in
this case."59 The practical wisdom of Justice Dennis's position can be
seen from the potentially misleading statements about causation in
the majority opinion. The statements of the majority require clarifica-
tion of the relationship between the rule on principals and the prin-
ciples of causation.
Criminal Code article 24, codifying the rule on principals, often
plays a necessary part in th proof of the "act" requirement for
criminal conduct." A defendant's act, e.g., driving the getaway car
in a robbery, may not be sufficient to produce the criminal harm with
which the defendant is charged, robbery. As a principal, however, the
defendant stands responsible for the act of another, the hold-up man,
if the defendant's acts "aid and abet" or "counsel or procure" com-
mission of the crime.
6 1
What justifies the rule on principals? Is it merely a fiction to avoid
proof of the act requirement? Is one indicted as a principal responsi-
ble for all the acts of his partners in crime? Answers to these and
related questions can be derived from the principles of causation.
The Criminal Code contains no rules as such on causation;62 never-
theless, the principles of causation are necessary to explain the rela-
tionship between criminal conduct and legally proscribed harms. 3 In
56. 410 So. 2d 1055 (La. 1982).
57. Id. at 1056.
58. Id. at 1057.
59. Id. at 1058 (Dennis, J., concurring).
60. LA. R.S. 14:24 (1950); see LA. R.S. 14:8 & comments (1950).
61. LA. R.S. 14:24.
62. The "year and a day rule" which relates to causation in homicide has been
eliminated from article 29 of the Criminal Code. See 1978 La. Acts, No. 393, § 1, amend-
ing LA. R.S. 14:29.
63. J. HALL, supra note 29, at 247.
1982]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
criminal law, as opposed to tort law, causal relationships usually are
easily recognized because they are based on voluntary conduct, such
as when one person shoots another."' Occasionally, a homicide may
pose a problem of legal causation in terms of "direct" causation; for
instance, when a minor blow leads to a death. It also may cause a
problem in terms of "intervening" causation; for instance, when a mor-
tal wound is followed by the negligent or intentional conduct of another
which leads to death. 5 Although not often addressed in these terms,
the rule on principals also involves the principles of causation. If
one "counsels or procures" another to commit a crime, one has legal-
ly caused the other to commit a crime in the sense of "motivating"
the criminal conduct. 7 If one aids and abets another in a crime, the
act of one is the act of the other 6 and, depending on the mental ele-
ment of each, will make the one who aids guilty of the same, a greater,
or lesser crime. 9
In Batiste, the defendant apparently argued that Bolden's subse-
quent fatal blow presented a problem of intervening causation."0
Presumably, the defendant would have characterized Bolden's act as
a "superseding cause" which terminated his own liability for the vic-
tim's death. 1 However, the court, in effect, characterized the two
wounds as "contributory causes""2 by stating that "[s]eparate fatal
wounds inflicted in one encounter by two individuals make each guilty
of homicide."73 The court quoted language from a Kentucky case which
stated: "The law will not stop, in such a case, to measure which wound
is the more serious, and to speculate upon which actually caused the
death ....", After citing a number of cases," the court also stated
64. Id. at 256.
65. See id. at 257-70.
66. See R. PERKINS, supra note 17, at 686.
67. J. HALL, supra note 29, at 251-52 & 270.
68. R. PERKINS, supra note 17, at 686.
69. See State v. McAllister, 366 So. 2d 1340, 1343 (La. 1978).
70. See 410 So. 2d at 1057.
71. See R. PERKINS, supra note 17, at 698.
72. See id. at 699.
73. 410 So. 2d at 1057.
74. 410 So. 2d at 1057 (quoting Bennett v. Commonwealth, 150 Ky. 604, 606, 150
S.W. 806, 808 (1912)).
75. The court refers the reader to the following cases: Jordan v. State, 82 Ala.
1, 2 So. 460 (1887); Brinson v. State, 144 Fla. 228, 198 So. 15 (1940); Jones v. Com-
monwealth, 281 S.W.2d 920 (Ky. 1955); Commonwealth v. Gross, 271 Ky. 455, 112 S.W.2d
689 (1938); Farley v. Commonwealth, 268 Ky. 277, 104 S.W.2d 972 (1937); Payne v. Com-
monwealth, 255 Ky. 533, 75 S.W.2d 14 (1934); Palmer v. State, 223 Md. 341, 164 A.2d
467 (1960); Anderson v. State, 43 Tex. Crim. R. 275, 65 S.W. 523 (1901). The court
refers the reader to People v. Lewis, 124 Cal. 551, 57 P. 470 (1899), a case not involv-
ing principals. This case has been criticized for holding the defendant was guilty of
homicide in a situation where the victim committed suicide following a fatal wound
inflicted by the defendant. See J. HALL, supra note 29, at 165-167.
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that the defendant was guilty as a principal."6
Although the facts of the case involve persons acting as principals,
it is not clear whether the court would apply its statements on causa-
tion to persons acting independently. This writer submits that the
court's rather broad statements on causation may be misleading if
uncritically applied to persons'acting independently. First, the Ken-
tucky case and all but one of the others cited involve persons acting
together. While persons acting together to cause a death are con-
tributory causes, persons acting independently may or may not be
contributory causes.7 If Bolden had been acting independently from
Batiste in this case, Batiste should have been guilty of no more than
attempted homicide, because the other, second blow was "immediate-
ly fatal." If the second fatal blow is independent and in fact "im-
mediately fatal," the first blow would not be a contributory cause of
the death.
The relationship between the rule on principals and the principles
of causation becomes particularly important for problems presented
by the felony-murder rule.78 The felony-murder rule has been much
criticized for extending a felon's liability to a homicide which was not
actually "caused" by him." In Louisiana, by strictly contruing the
statute rather than relying on the principles of causation, the court
has limited the felony-murder/felony-manslaughter doctrine in a way
that prevents a felon from being liable for a death where the injury
was actually inflicted by the victim or a third party."0
In State v. West," the court affirmed a felony-murder conviction
in terms which do not rely on, but can be explained consistently with,
the principles of causation. West accompanied McDonald during the
armed robbery of a female victim. He then drove McDonald's
automobile, and McDonald drove with the victim in her automobile
to a location several blocks away. After a time, McDonald left the
victim, entered his own automobile and, as he was driven away by
West, fired shots which killed the victim of the robbery. The "[d]efen-
dant argue[d] that the killing did not occur in the course of an armed
robbery because the robbery occurred several blocks away and had
been completed before McDonald shot the victim."82 The court affirmed
the conviction while concluding both that the events "constituted
76. 410 So. 2d at 1057.
77. See R. PERKINS, supra note 17, at 698-701.
78. J. HALL, supra note 29, at 274-81.
79. R. Perkins, supra note 17, at 721-22; W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, CRIMINAL LAW
265-66 (1972).
80. State v. Garner, 115 So. 2d 855 (La. 1959).
81. 408 So. 2d 1302 (La. 1982).
82. Id. at 1305.
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essentially a single criminal incident" and "that the killing occurred
as part of the armed robbery."3
On what basis can the court's conclusion be justified when the
necessary elements of the armed robbery had been completed at in
different location, sometime before the killing? For purposes of
analysis, suppose that the facts had been the same except that West
had departed after the money had been taken from the victim. Under
such circumstances, West would still have been a principal to the rob-
bery. However, would the killing by McDonald, which occurred as part
of the armed robbery, have been imputed to West? Would the acts
occurring after his participation had ceased have been imputed to
West, even if it was agreed that "but for" his participation in the
robbery, the killing would not have occurred? Under these facts, the
court would likely have concluded that the killing was not within the
scope of the joint conduct.' West's liability as a principal would have
been limited to those consequences reasonably related to the acts
occurring during his participation in the crime.
Resort to the principles of causation may be necessary to limit
or explain the scope of a felon's liability in a case of felony-murder.
Failure to limit the felony-murder rule consistently with the principles
of causation has led to some unwarranted extensions of the rule.85
The result in West does not represent any unwarranted expansion
of the scope of liability. In terms of causation, it can be explained
because West's acts were related to the robbery not only in terms
of time and plan but also in terms of his continuing voluntary con-
duct and criminal state of mind which aided the actual killer.8
83. Id.
84. See State v. Witherspoon, 292 So. 2d 499 (La. 1974). Whether or not the kill-
ing falls within the scope of the felony is a question of fact in Louisiana. State v.
Bessar, 213 La. 299, 34 So. 2d 785 (1948).
85. See J. HALL, supra note 29, at 274-78.
86. See id. at 281-84.
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